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LEGAL FORUM 
One Year of Practise with tb~e A~ct 
Peter Kiely and Andrew Caisley* 
Introduction 
'The introduction of the Employment Contrncts .Act 1991 marked a fundamental chang~e 
in New Zealand Industrial Law. This change is clearly reflect~ed in the introductions to the 
Act and its predecessor .. 
The pwpose of the Labour Relations Act 1987 was: 
"(a) To facilitate the fonnation of effective and accountable Unions and ~effective and 
accowuable employer's organisations. 
(b) To provide procedwes for the orderly conduct of relations between workers and 
~employers; 
(c) To provide a framework to ~enable ag•,eements to be reached between workers and 
employers; 
(d) To repeal the Industrial R~elations Act 1973 and certain other enactments." 
By contrast the purpose of the Employment Contracts .Act 1991 is "to p!iomote an 
effici~ent labour market and, in particular: 
(a) To provide for freedom of association; 
(b) To allow employees to detennine who should .represent their interests in relation to 
1 . " emp oyment ISSues ... 
Each of the statutes proceeds on the basis of a contrasting and conflicting set of political, 
philosophical and economic assumptions, and aft~er a year of operation the practical effects 
of this change we becoming apparent. 
The year has seen a wide variety of new legal developments as employers, employees 
and all others in the area adapt to the new environment. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine some of the more significant issues which have arisen, and record the approach the 
Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal have adopted. No anempt is made to 
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provide a comprehensive view of all the issues that have arisen, as that would require a paper 
of considerably greater length. Rather, seven areas have been selected which clearly mark 
the distinctiveness of the new environment. 
These topics, which emerged in broadly cMonological order over the frrst 12 months, are: 
- Sanctity of contract 
- 'The "right to manage" 
- The expiry of CECs 
-
-
Implied tei Ins 
Partial lockouts 
Strikes and lockouts 
Picketing 
Sanctity of contract 
One of the most surprising features of the jurisprudence to emerge since the passage of 
the Act has been the Court's repeated statements that employers may not unilaterally vary 
employment contracts. This is surprising, not because it is a novel legal concept, in fact for 
precisely the opposite reason. It is a surprise that the Court has been required to consider the 
issue of unilateral variation of contract at all. 
Perhaps the most fundamental feature of contract law is that if the arrangement entered 
into meets the requirements for a valid "contract" then it is binding and ·enforceable and may 
not be varied ·except by consent. Precisely why some employers have failed to comprehend 
this notion, which is so fundamental to all business and commeocial activity, is not clear. One 
might speculate that some of the misleading publicity prior to the introduction of the Act is 
in part to blame. 
Even for employers who do not understand the central feature of ~contact law, the A~ct 
expressly states that "employment contracts create enforceable rights and obligations" (Section 
43(a)). However the issue has arisen, and the Courts have had several occasions to 
comprehensively reject the notion. 
The most succinct early rejection of a right to unilateral variation arose in Grant v 
Super strike Bowling Centres .Ltd (ALC 81/91, Finnigan J, 11n /91). His Honour ~ecorded: 
"the employer was attempting to alter the terms and conditions of her employment contract 
It is trite law that such a change cannot be unilateral, it .must be mutual" 
and later 
"'the law governing unilateral variation of an employment contract is unequivocal" 
and again 
"a contract is a contract, and it must run its course". 
Two of the other early cases in which the Court reiterated its commitment to the notion 
of sanctity of contract, and rejected employer attempts to unilaterally vary were NZ Resident 
Doctors' Associations v Otago Area Health Boa~d (1991) 4 NZFJ ~C 95, 334 and Prendergast 
v Associated Stevedores Limited (ALC 84/91, 26 July 1991). 
' 
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Right to manage 
The right to unilaterally vary is most ~commonly alleged to arise as part and parcel of "an 
employer's right to manage their business". Precisely why this "right .. should give rise to a 
power to unilaterally vacy contracts is not clear. It is unliklely that thefe is a business person 
in the country who would assert that his or her "right to manag~e their business" gives them 
the power to unilaterally reduce the rent payable to their landlord, or unilaterally reduce the 
price of supply contracts, and yet for some reason they persist in asserting that they do have 
the "right" to unilaterally vary their employment contracts. The fact that there is this different 
attitude in the area of employment suggests that the concept of an employment "contract" is 
still not well understood. 
Two clear statements by the Coun have expressly denied the existence of any such 
presumed right. In NZPSA v E.lectricity Corp. (WLC 54/91 27/6/91) the Court observed: 
"But the various observations about the employer's right to manage are not available as 
a general pretext for avoiding legal obligations voluntarily entered into but which it is no 
longer convenient to fulfil. So pernicious 8 doctrine would undennine the enforceability 
of collective agreements which is the cornerstone of the Labour Rela'tions Act 1987". 
Notwithstanding this, at the end of last year the argument was advanced again in the 
Court. In NLGO~U & Beazley v Auckland City (AEC 42/91 ~Goddard CJ, 3/12/91) it.was 
argued for Auckland City that the Council "was justified in making the changes to conditions 
of employment for commercially compelling reasons". Tbe Coun comprehensively rejected 
the submission and stated: 
"by and large, however, the time for the exercise of the management prerogative is when 
entering into employment contracts and not at the time of their perfonnance. If an 
obligation has been assumed then it must be discharged and 8 party to an employment 
contract which fails to discharge an obligation is always at risk of being ordered to comply 
'with the contract It is quite fallacious to regard some obligations under an employment 
conliaet (for example, to pay wages) as being important and others (for example, such as 
those in dispute in the present case) as being some way subsidiary and requiring to be 
complied with only if the party on whom the obligation rests sees fit The ~canfinal rule is 
that employment contracts create enfOJceable .rights and obligations and it is not for the 
Court or the 'Tribunal lO decide 'Which obligations should be enforced and which not need 
be; the parties have already decided that for themselves by entering into the contract, and 
it is not open to the Tribunal to exempt any party from the obligations it has assumed". 
A view has been ~expressed that if "breach of contract" actions (which are essentially 
what the unilateral variation cases are) are brought using the vehicle of personal gri~evance 
proceedings alleging an unjustifiable action to the employee's detriment, then the employer 
is given scope to argue the commercial justification for his or her actions. 
It is doubtful whether this is cottect It would be regrettable if by simply altering the 
fotm of pleadings the employer could gain or lose something as fundamental as a unilateral 
right to vary a contract. In principle there would seem to be good reason for restricting the 
employer's right to defend actions on the grounds of commercial necessity to cases where the 
act complained of is lawful, but alleged to be unreasonable. 
This approach received support in the Auckland City case where the Coun, after 
discussing the alleged "right to manage" arising out of G N Hale & Son Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 
151 ., observed: 
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11 tO all this can be added the obvious observation that there was no question of any breach 
of contract by the employer in the Hale case; the Labour Cowt (and the Court of Appeal) 
was concerned with the question of whether an employer which had acted lawfully so far 
as the contract was concerned had nevertheless acted unjustifiably". 
Of course in many cases it will be preferable to approach the matter by way of 
compliance order, since this is really what the employee is seeking, and also avoids any 
possibility of the employer being able to defend his or her actions on the grounds that they 
were commercially justifiable. 
What are the terms? 
Given that the Courts have so trenchantly stated that the terms of employment contracts 
cannot be varied unilaterally it is critical to detetmine precisely what the "tetms" are. This 
has been one of the other principle areas of litigation during the frrst year of the Act. As 
awards and agreements have expired some attention has come to be focused on the proper 
interpretation of Section 19(4) of the Act, and particularly the meaning of the words "'based 
on". 
The clause basically provides that where a collectiv·e employment contract expires 
employment continues under an individual employment contract based on the ~expired 
collective contract. The frrst major decision which indicated the approach of the Court was 
Prendergast and the NZ Waterfront Workers' Union v Associated Stevedores Ltd (AL~C 84/91, 
26n/91}. The Court adopted an approach which strongly favoured the preservation of 
existing tetrns and conditions and held: 
"if the Tribunal can be persuaded that particular tenns and conditions of the expired 
collective employment contract can have no application to the individual employment 
contract and do not affect or concern the employee, either directly or indirectly, then such 
tenns and conditions :may not form part of the individual employment contract". (Emphasis 
added). 
In the immediate case before the Court this test enabled the employees to retain protection 
against "casualisation" of the workplace. 
The issue was further considered by the full Court in United Food & Chemical Workers 
v Talley and Anor (WLC 73/91, 9/8/91). The Court approved the test in .Prendergast and 
said: 
"in deciding the precise tenns of any individual employment contract under Section 19(4), 
it will not be the nonn to exclude terms of the expired collective contract". 
However the full Court adopted an approach which may be even more narrow than the 
Prendergast approach and stated: 
.. we conclude that "based on't may be regarded as an equivalent in English of the ·convenient 
Latin phrase "mutatis mutandis". The expired collective document is to be amended to the 
extent necessary, but no more, to make it read sensibly as a contract between an individual 
worker and the employer or as a series of conttacts between individual worketS and the 
employer or employers". 
• 
.. .. 
... 
• 
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The Court upheld various existing Union rights such as rights of entry, Union meetings and 
deduction of Union fees. It should be noted that the Prendergast decision at least is subject 
to appeal. 
Implied terms 
There has been a perception that the Industrial Couns hav.e been comparatively liberal 
in their approach to interpreting employment contracts, and implying terms. The Couns have, 
for example, fmnly accepted the notion that awards and agreements are usually not drafted 
by expens and therefore require a libenll interpretativ.e approach. They have also been 
relatively ready to find that a custom and practise ~can amount to an implied te1rn, and 
generally have upheld the value of taking an interpretative approach which recognises 
industrial/workplace realities, sometimes at the expense of strict legal principles. ·Of course 
there may have been some value in this. 
The decision of the full Court of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-G.eneral v Post 
Primary Teachers' Association ('CA 357fJl, 20/12/91) may help employers narrow the 
contractual obligations by which they we bound. The Court of Appeal, in a judgment 
delivered by Gault J, held that the test for implying tetms into employment contracts is the 
same as that for implying te1ms into any other contract. Particularly the Court found that: 
are.: 
"there is no established basis for the implication into employment contnlcts of tenns that the 
parties have not agreed should be binding conditions of engagement for the reason simply 
that it would be reasonable to do so". 
The Court set out the four bases on which terms may be implied into contracts. They 
(a) Implication by rules of law. 
(b) Custom. 
(c) Interpretation of contractual provisions by reference to an underlying assumption. 
(d) The business efficacy test. 
The Court detailed the "business efficacy" test for implying tetms into contracts and held that 
before any tetm can be implied on this basis it must be: 
(a) reasonable and equitable; 
(b) necessary to give business efficacy to the contract; 
(c) so obvious that it goes without saying; 
(d) capable of clear expression; 
(e) not contradicted by any express te1ms of the contract 
Case law regarding impli·ed te1ms in ordinary commercial contracts reveals that it is often 
difficult to satisfy the foregoing requirements, particularly the requirement that the implication 
of the term must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. 
Partial lockouts 
Disputes arising out of renegotiation of employment contracts have also been the subject 
of judicial consideration. The decision which has probably atnacted the most attention in the 
area of negotiations for employment contracts is Paul & NZ Community Services Union v NZ 
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Society for The Intellectually Handicapped (WEC 1/92, 15 January 1992). 
In very broad tet ms, the factual background was that the lliC was facing serious 
financial difficulties, and in the preceding two financial years had incurred cash losses in 
excess of $9 million. It had undertaken restructuring which resulted in the disappearance of 
some 300 positions, but notwithstanding this had a projected deficit for the 91/92 financial 
year of $11.5 million. Fot1nal negotiations for a new collective employment contract began 
in August 1991, but had broken down by the end of November. The talks were deadlocked 
and further attempts to make progress were unsuccessful. 
The employer issued a notice to all staff advising them that as from 6 January 1992 the 
IHC would not be "observing or perfotaoing certain provisions of your employment contract 
with a view to compelling you and your fellow employees to accept the tettns specified by 
IHC as your employer for a collective employment contract". The letter went on to specify 
the tetms of the expired collective contract that would not be complied with, and basically 
advised that the rnc was imposing a wage cut. The plaintiffs issued proceedings seeking 
injunctions and the matter was accorded an early fiXture so that it was determined on the 
substantive basis, not purely on an interlocutory basis. 
The company defended its actions on the ,grounds that it was engaging in a lockout as 
defmed in Section 62 of the Employment Contracts Act, and that the lockout was not 
specifically unlawful pursuant to Section 63, and did relate to negotiations for a collective 
employment contract and was therefore lawful pursuant to Section 64. 
The Plaintiff employees attempted to create a festriction on the definition of a lockout 
based on certain statements in the judgment of Colgan J in NZAIJ'A v Air New Zealand Ltd 
(AEC 35/91, 4/11/91) (the Pilots' Beards case). In that case Colgan J suggested that where 
the demands for a new contract, and the breach of the contract, were one and the same thing, 
no lockout was occurring. 
The lliC was able to establish that it was breaking some or all of its employment 
contracts. In fact the evidence of the plaintiffs cl~early supported this fact It was also able 
to establish that the reason it was breaking the employment contracts was "with a view to 
compelling any employees .... to accept teuus of employment or comply with any demands 
made by the employer"'. Accordingly it was clear that the actions taken by the lliC fell 
within the definition of a lockout. There was no real question about the lockout being 
unlawful pursuant to Section 63 as it was clear that none of those provisions applied. 
'The final question was whether the lockout related to negotiation of a collective 
employment contract. If it did, then the prima facie unlawful actions of the employer 
received statutory protection. ~on the evidence it was clear that the lockout did relate to 
negotiations for the new collective employment contract and accordingly the lockout was 
lawful. It should be noted that the Judge expressly stated that he was: 
"unable to follow that part of Colgan J's. judgment in the NLALPA ... case in so far as he 
exPfesses the view that the definition of "lockout" in the legislation contemplates compliance 
with a demand that is independent of the events which contemplate the breach of the 
contract of employment" 
The decision created somewhat of an outcry. At a practical level this is understandable, 
since in effect IHC was able to impose a unilateral wage cut. However in tetrns of legal 
theory it is clear that the IHC decision does not giv~e employers a right to unilaterally vary 
, 
' 
contracts. • 
When an employer engages in a partial lockout of this type, it is not a variation of the 
• 
I 
• 
• 
• 
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contract. The contract remains extant, and the et1~ployer is clearly in breach of the contract. 
However if certain conditions are met, the breach of contract is rendered lawful, pursuant to 
Section 64. If at any time the fundamental circumstances change the employer's actions may 
be deprived of the protection they otherwise have, and the breach of contract would again 
become unlawful. Accordingly it is clear that the contract itself has not been varied. 
It should be noted that employers have had the legal right to engage in a partial lockout 
of the IHC variety for a considerable period of time. It is not something new that has been 
"created" by the Employment Contracts Act. However it may be that in the present economic 
environment it is a more effective negotiating tactic than it has been previously. It should 
also be noted that the partial lockout is the employer's ~equivalent of the employee,s right to 
engage in a go-slow. or re£use overtime or work to rule . 
Strikes and lockouts 
In the past the right to strike has always been more effective than the right to lockout, 
since in the days of compulsory union membership (whether de facto, or de jure) and blaMet 
award covemge an employer's operation invariably ceased the moment his existing workfooce 
left the site. The employer had no opportunity of continuing to generate an income, and 
substantial losses were incurred. By comparison, the employee (at least theo!ietically) had the 
freedom to undertake temporary or part time work during a strike or lockout to ensure that 
at least some income was maintained. 
In the new environment, with genuinely voluntary union membership, and no blanket 
coverage, an employer may now have the power to maintain some limited income during 
industrial action by engaging a part-time or temporary work force. 
Against this background it is useful to consider the approach the Courts are adopting to 
supervision of bargaining tactics. It was hoped by some that the Courts would even up the 
perceived imbalance in bargaining power by imposing a requirement to negotiate in good 
faith, or by Iielying on the "harsh and oppressive" provisions of Section 57. However after 
a number of decisions it is now becoming apparent that the ~Courts will not impose any such 
gloss on the wording of the statute. In the JHC decision Castle J. stated: 
"I accept Counsel's submission that the only relevant issue is whether negotiations are in 
fact being conducted, not the quality or bargaining strength of 'them or the panies. The 
allegation that IHC has been unreasonable or inflexible, if £ound to be so, is therefore of no 
avail to the CSU". 
In the Adams .& Others v Alliance Textiles & Others (CEC 22/91, 22 Nov.ember 1991) 
decision the applicants strongly urged the ·Court to adopt Canadian and American authority 
importin.g an obligation of good faith on the employer, and requiring the ~employer to adopt 
a neutral stance. In a very lengthy judgment of the full Coun the argument was rejected and 
indeed the Court stated: 
"the Act is quite specific as to the conduct which is prohibited and the ~Court is not justified 
in putting a gloss on ·the Act by imponing a requirement nowhere expressed in it that the 
employer should remain neutral when its vilal interests are affected and maintain in that 
situation a "hands-off stance·". Provided it does not use undue infiuence or resort to duress 
(including economic dmess) or harsh or oppressive behaviour, an employer may adopt and 
impart to its employees a partisan stance" . 
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The Court outlined the obligations which fall on an employer once a bargaining agent 
has established his or her authority. They are: 
(a) If the employer is going to negotiate, they must negotiate with the authorised 
representative; 
(b) The employer may not insist upon negotiating with the employees directly, or with some 
other representativ~e; 
(c) The employer need not negotiate at all; 
(d) The ~employer may offer ~direct .negotiation with the employees; 
(e) The employer must not exert undue influence on the representative not to act or to cease 
• 
acnng; 
(f) The employer must not exert undue influence in relation to any employment issue on any 
person by reason of that person's association (or lack of it) with employees. 
It is apparent from the stance the Court has adopted that the law now provides very little 
protection for employee bargaining agents and petrnits very aggressive bargaining tactics to 
be adopted by employers. 
Picketing 
In view of the "more liberal" bargaining environment that the new Act may encourage 
it can be expected that the issue of what amounts to a lawful picket will be the subject of 
judicial consideration. 
It should be noted that this issue may come before the High Court for consideration, 
rather than the Employment Tribunal or Employment ~Court. This is so because the 
Employment Court has jurisdiction in Jiespect of proceeding founded on an employment 
contract. Proceedings in r~espect of unlawful pickets may be founded on a breach of an 
implied tetnt of an employment contract, but are more likely to be founded on ~common law 
torts such as trespass and nuisance. 
In dealing with this issue under the Labour Relations Act 1987 Gault J. held that the 
High Court did have jurisdiction in the decision of Waikato Asphalt Limited v Nonhern 
Distribution Workers (1991) 4 NZELC 95, 293. Although the issue did not appear to be 
expressly considered, the High Court again considered an alleged unlawful picket in McGinty 
v Northern Distribution Limited (CP 1959/91, 4 December 1991). That decision was 
substantially resolved on the basis of undertakings given by the Union so no final decision 
was given by the Judge. The case is also noteworthy because the Judge raised the issue of 
the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 is to promote "an efficient labour 
market". The efficiency refers to "economic efficiency" in terrns of conservative economic 
theory. In other words, the purpose of the Act is to create a labour market where there is a 
high degree of competition, and where wages are both upwardly, and downwardly, flexible. 
From the survey of legal issues above, it seems cl~ear that the Courts have adapted to the 
new environment, and a~e ~enforcing the Act in accordance with its purpose. 
There can be no doubt now that employment ~contracts are binding, and enforceable, in 
• 
• 
• 
,. 
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much the same way as all other commercial contracts. Once entered into employers are 
bound by the; terms, and cannot unilaterally vary those contracts even if they consider it 
desirable, convenient or profitable to do so. 
Employers do have a right to manage their business, but as with management in other 
areas of business this involves carefully considering the tetrns of all contracts before entering 
into them, and does not extend to give employers a right to renege on contracts afterwards. 
Even where collective employment contracts have expired, employers will in most 
circumstances continue to be bound by the tet•ns of those contracts until some variation is 
agreed to. 
In addition to the express tetms of an employment contract, other teuns may be implied, 
but only in accordance with the principles applying in respect of ordinary commercial 
contracts. 
Negotiations for employment contracts proceed on the same basis as negotiations for any 
other conttact, such as negotiations for an overdraft at the bank, or negotiations for a lease 
with the landlord. There is no obligation to conduct these negotiations in good faith, nor any 
obligation to adopt a neutral stance. 'The Court will not enquire as to the reasonableness of 
an employer's attitude. In addition to this, the employer has the power to engage in lockouts, 
and the employees have the power to engage in stri..kes. The Act prescribes the limits within 
which such activities will be lawful, and the Courts appear to be unwilling to impose any 
protective gloss to assist employees. 
There can be no doubt that the new environment is substantially different to that which 
has operated previously, and all those involved will be required to develop new attitudes and 
new approaches. 
